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Guardall Security Group Limited v. Reinford Kabwe CAZ Appeal No. 44/2019.
Chanda Chungu 1
Facts
The Court of Appeal dealt with a judgment of the Industrial Relations Division of the High
Court which was passed more than one year after the matter was commenced. The Court of
Appeal interpreted sections 85(3)(b) (ii) and 94 (1) of the Industrial and Labour Relations Act
which prescribe that judgment should be within one (1) year of the filing of the complaint and
sixty (60) days from close of trial.
Holding
Section 85(3) of the Industrial and Labour Relations Act provides that cases before the
Industrial Relations Division of the High Court must be dealt with within one year from the
day that the complaint is filed. 2 Further, Section 94(1) of the Industrial and Labour Relations
Act provides that a court shall deliver judgment within sixty (60) days of hearing the case. 3
The Court of Appeal interpreted sections 85(3)(b)(ii) and 94 (1) of the Industrial and Labour
Relations Act which prescribe that judgment should be within one year of the filing of the
complaint and 60 days from close of trial. The Court of Appeal was of the opinion that:
Failure to act within the set time limit robs the Court of jurisdiction to take any
further action in that matter. Whether or not the non-compliance has been
caused by the Court or other players is immaterial as the cesser of jurisdiction
is by act of law.
From the above, the court was stating that if the matter is not dealt with within one year, the
court thereafter lacks jurisdiction, i.e., does not have the power to deal with the matter further.
The Court of Appeal further guided that:
We take the view that section 19 (3) (b) (ii) is a re-enforcement to section 94 (1)
to cover, not only breaches caused by the Judge, but also those caused by the
litigants. We would go further to state that in couching ground one by using the
word “ought” when the actual word used by the section is “shall.” The fact that
no penalty is provided by Section 19 (3) (b) (ii) for breach thereof, does not
make it merely directory but implies a termination of jurisdiction on the part of
the Court to do anything further on the matter. As regards sanctions, we are of
the view that if it is shown that the breach is caused by the Judge, Article 143
(b) of the Constitution is still applicable even if the section does not specifically
provide for it as does Section 94. We therefore, allow ground one of the appeal
and declare the Judgment delivered by the Hon. Mr. Justice E. L. Musona on
14th December 2018, null and void for want of jurisdiction and set it aside
accordingly. In view of the decision on ground one, grounds two and three of
the appeal are rendered otiose. We accordingly remit the record to the Industrial
Relations Division of the High Court for re-hearing before another Judge of
competent jurisdiction.
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LLB (Cape Town), LLM ( Cape Town), MSc (Oxford), lecturer in law at the University of Zambia
Section 85(3) of the Industrial and Labour Relations Act.
3 Section 94(1) of the Industrial and Labour Relations Act, Chapter 269 of the Laws of Zambia.
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The Court of Appeal declared that the judgment which is delivered outside the mandatory time
period was null and void and referred it back to the Industrial Relations Division of the High
Court for re-hearing before another Judge of competent jurisdiction.
Significance
This judgment reinforces the need for the Industrial Relations Division of the High Court to
decide matters within one year from the date the Notice of Complaint is filed and within 60
days from the close of trial – and the High Court within 90 days from the filing of Submissions.
Therefore, notwithstanding the merits and substance of the case, a judgment delivered out of
time can be set aside for being null and void at appeal stage and sent back to be re-heard by a
different adjudicator. It is submitted in some cases the parties may delay the delivering of
judgment due to vexatious attempts by one or both parties to delay the matter. Judges will have
to be diligent to ensure that they comply with their statutory obligations with respect to
rendering a decision in employment matters.
Whereas the rule on the way judgments should be delivered in employment matters is clear,
within one year from the filing of the Notice of Complaint and 60 days from the close of trial,
the harsh and hard approach taken by the Court of Appeal failed to take into consideration the
following issues.
Firstly, the court should have considered the fact that there is usually a delay from the time
when the Notice of Complaint is filed and its allocation to a Judge. Usually, due to
administrative challenges at the Industrial Relations Division, including scanning of
documents and the process of allocation, it can take up to a month for a complaint to be
allocated to a Judge.
Thereafter, the Judge is tasked with studying the file to understand the nature and scope of the
dispute. Depending on the complexity of the matter coupled with the workload of the judges,
it could take several weeks for the Judge to conclude their examination of the file.
We wish to point out that before the Industrial Relations Division hears a matter and delivers
judgment, it is permitted to refer the matter to mediation. Under Rule 12 of the Industrial
Relations Court (Arbitration and Mediation Procedure) Rules, the Court or a judge may refer
any action to mediation at any stage of the proceedings except where the Court or judge
considers a case unsuitable for referral to mediation. This gives the court the power in matters
commenced in the Industrial Relations Division of the High Court to refer disputes to mediation
at any stage.
In practice, largely due to the large number of cases before the court, most Judges refer disputes
to mediation before setting aside the matter for trial. This is done as a way of exploring whether
the matter can be resolved before the court deals with it. It is a practice of the court to allocate
three (3) months for the mediation process to start and conclude given that mediators equally
have several other matters allocated to them that seek resolution by the court.
As can be seen from the above, even before the matter is set down for trial, there are various
process such as allocation, studying of the matter and mediation that ‘eat into’ the one-year
period within which an employment matter must be dealt with by the court. This in essence
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leaves nine months for trial, filing of submissions and appropriate determination of the matter.
One can argue that juxtaposed against the number of cases the court must deal with, this may
not be sufficient time. As such, the Court of Appeal’ decision that a judgment rendered outside
the mandatory period will be null and void may be too harsh given the circumstances and
challenges outlined.
In addition to the above, it should be mentioned that it is not always the case that a matter, once
allocated, will be referred to mediation and then trial for determination. In between these
proceedings, the court may be tasked with dealing with interlocutory applications. These are
applications made by either party during court proceedings before Judgment is made. These
applications may include but are not limited to preliminary issues, applications for further and
better particulars, amendment of court process or consolidation of matters to mention but a
few. These applications which must be disposed of by the court, usually before trial and thus
affect the ability of the court to meet the one (1) year timeframe within which to deliver a
judgment. Further, in some cases one of the parties may be unwell and unable to attend to court
proceedings. As such due to no fault on the part of the court, they cannot proceed with the
matter and thus the timeframe within which to deliver judgment is reduced.
This brings us to the issue of the number of Judges and administrative staff available. As it
relates to Judges, currently, the Industrial Relations Division has five (5) Judges, each tasked
with having to deal with a plethora of actions. This often proves to be a huge challenge and
hampers the ability of the court to deliver judgments within the timeframe provided for by the
law.
The Court of Appeal did not take into consideration the fact that Judges may fall ill or be
restrained by a global pandemic such as the coronavirus that may temporarily affect the court’s
operations. This should be viewed against the background that the High Court has two
mandatory vacation periods throughout the year when the courts are not in session. These
constraints were not adequately analysed when the court delivered its judgment rendering
judgments delivered outside the mandatory period as null and void.
The Guardall decision paid scant attention to the fact that Judges in the Industrial Relations
Division, like their colleagues in other divisions of the High Court are mandated to attend to
and deliberate on criminal matters during criminal sessions around the country throughout the
year. In election years, their responsibility extends to hearing election petitions of dejected
candidates seeking to challenge the election of their competitors. These responsibilities, in
addition to their duties as Judges of the Industrial Relations Division makes it difficult to
manage and maintain the one-year deadline imposed by the law. It is against this background
that declaring judgments null, and void may have been unduly harsh.
Lastly, the Guardall decision could have a dangerous impact on litigants, the employees who
seek to challenge potential wrongful, unfair and/or unlawful acts of their employees. The Court
of Appeal did not consider the cost implications that declaring a judgment null, and void would
have. Furthermore, litigants would have to wait for another prolonged period of time to have
their matter re-heard and determined which delays the administration of justice.
The reason for the short period given to file a complaint and for delivery of judgment is to
ensure that employment matters, being matters that go to the root of the employees’ livelihood
are dealt with in a reasonably efficient manner. This is due to the importance of having issues
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relating to employment disputes and the income security of a person disposed of expeditiously.
Work-related disputes are seen as critical matters due to the implication they could have on an
employee and his ability to sustain himself and his family. It is not only employment matters
that have been identified as needing to be dealt with swiftly in Zambia, as the rules governing
criminal and commercial matters 4 also seek to ensure they are dealt with in a timely manner
due to the impact and importance on the parties and society.
For the above reasons, there is no doubt that judgments should be passed as soon as possible
to avoid inordinate delay in the attainment of justice. In Chilanga Cement Plc v. Venus Kasito, 5
the Supreme Court pointed out that a judgment delayed equals denial of justice. Kaoma JS,
delivering judgment on behalf of the court stated that:
Although there is no statutory rule that a judgment must be delivered within a
specified time (usually three months in their case) judgment has to be delivered
"within a reasonable time" and what is reasonable may vary according to the
complexity of the legal issues, the volume and nature of the evidence and other
matters and where delay occurs, the litigants should receive an apology and, if
possible, an explanation.
The Supreme Court emphasised and warned that continued and unreasonable delays in
deciding court cases not only have an adverse effect on the parties, but also on the reputation
and credibility of the justice system. As such, the rationale for the Guardall decision was good
in that it sought to mitigate against delays. However, the effect that o judgment is impractical
given the challenges highlighted above.
The most glaring challenge of the judgment is the declaration that the court loses jurisdiction
if one year passes as the court does not give guidance on what happens in such an instance.
Further by stating that the judgment is null and void if delivered outside the mandatory period
means that regardless of the substance and merits of the judgment, it can be set aside on that
basis alone.
The question is should a judgment that is sound in terms of substance be set aside purely
because it was delivered outside time – particularly in case where the delay was due to no fault
of any party involved. The answer to this is no. As such, there are some proposed solutions that
can be implemented to ensure that Judges deliver Judgments within the prescribed time frame.
Of course, the most obvious solution would be to increase the number of judges and
administrative staff – however in the face of limited resources, this may not be feasible. As
such, creative solutions need to be carved and proposed.
Firstly, there is a need for the court to emphasise that the court cannot hear a matter that is
prematurely brought before the court before administrative channels are exhausted or brought
after the mandatory 90-day period. Section 85 of the Industrial and Labour Relations Act
expressly that:
The court shall not consider a complaint or an application unless the
complainant or applicant present the complaint or application to the court –
Section 168 of the Criminal Procedure Code Act, Chapter 88 of the Laws of Zambia and Order
LIII of the High Court Rules, Chapter 27 of the Laws of Zambia, respectively.
5 SCZ Appeal No. 86/2015.
4
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(a) Within ninety days of exhausting the administrative channels available to the

complainant or applicant; or,

(b) Where there are no administrative channels available to the complainant or

applicant, within ninety days of the occurrence of the event which gave rise
to the complaint or application
Provided that –
(i) Upon application by the applicant, the court may extend the period in which
the complaint or application may be presented before it.

The above provision provides that this Honourable Court shall not consider any complaint
unless it is brought within ninety (90) days of exhausting the administrative channels. The
Complainant asserts that section 85(3) relates only to the prescription of time within which to
bring applications. A proper reading of the said provision is that it provides a time frame
following the exhausting of administrative channels available. Therefore, to avoid an increase
in the volume of cases, the court should ensure that all administrative channels have been
exhausted before hearing a matter and dismiss those that are brought outside the mandatory
ninety (90) day period.
Secondly, there is a need to reduce the time lag within which an action is allocated to a Judge
from the date that it is filed. This process, which can take up to a month would allow the court
more time to examine a matter with a view to determining it within the prescribed time frame.
Once the matter is allocated to the Judge, it is imperative that they properly scrutinise whether
the matter can actually be resolved by mediation. Only matters which are capable of being
resolved at mediation should be referred to that process. Matters which are highly contentious
in nature should not be subject to mediation and referred straight to trial.
In the Industrial Relations Division of the High Court, matters are based on evidence given by
affidavits. The affidavits usually contain the material facts and documentation that each party
will rely on trial. In addition to the above, each party is entitled to call witnesses. Witnesses
can prolong the process and cause delay to the conclusion of trial. As such, Rule 64 of the
Industrial Relations Court Rules provides that:
64.

A witness at any proceedings shall be examined viva voce but the Court may at
any time order that any particular fact may be proved by affidavit.

As such, the court can order that evidence is given solely by Affidavit and thereafter
determined on the evidence adduced in the said Affidavits. This approach is permitted as the
Court of Appeal confirmed in the case of Victor Chileshe v. Celtel Zambia 6 where it was held
that:
…it is clear that an affidavit is medium through which the courts may receive evidence.
For that reason, the court may elect to receive affidavit evidence in lieu of oral
testimony.
If the court depends on affidavits in certain matters without formal trial and oral testimony,
more matters could be dispensed of within the prescribed one-year period. To supplement this,

6

Appeal No 231 of 2019
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the court may insist that Skeleton Arguments and Submissions are filed early so each party can
put the law they shall be relying on for the court’s consideration when determining the matter.
Further, we also wish to point out that in some instances a Judge may die or transferred to
another Division of the court or to a court situated in another city/town. In such instances, their
matter will have to be reallocated to another Judge which could cause delays and hinder the
ability of the court to deliver judgment in good time. We should point out that the Industrial
Relations Division has sought to address this. In Nosiku Likolo and 3 Other v. Magnum Security
Services Limited, 7 the court held that;
In my considered view, re-allocation of a matter to a different Judge of the Court
brings in a new perspective in that the one-year limit within which to dispose of
the matter starts running from the time he/she is re-allocated the file. Put another
way, the Court is given the leeway to deem the date of re-allocation as the date
when time starts running for disposal of the complaint. I believe this is in line
with the Court’s mandate as dispenser of substantial justice.
The above pronouncement which stated that the one year period begins to run once the matter
has been reallocated to another Judge is supported by the Court of Appeal’s approach in African
Banking Corporation v. Lazarus Muntete 8 where they stated that “It must be borne in mind that
what is declared null and void is not the complaint but the Judgment delivered outside the
prescribed time.” As such, the Industrial Relations Division’s solution is plausible and an
acceptable solution.
A further suggestion to assist would be to strengthen the Labour Office to resolving disputes.
If the Labour Office is equipped with the necessary tools and means to resolve the employment
matters, the courts will not be as inundated, and this will free up enough time for the court to
meet their statutory deadlines.
Lastly, it should be emphasised that notwithstanding the one (1) year time period within which
to deliver a judgment, a party cannot force the court to deliver Judgment. This was the decision
of the court in the case of Godfrey Miyanda v. The High Court 9 where the Supreme Court held
that:
I have no doubt in my mind that the remedy of mandamus is not available against the
judges of the superior courts of this country in the event of an alleged failure to perform
their judicial functions.
Although a party cannot force the court to deliver judgment, the Judge delivering judgment
must abide by any direction he/she gives as to when judgment will be ready. If the date reserved
for judgment is fast approaching but the Judge knows they will not be able to deliver, the
Supreme Court in John Sangwa v. Sunday Bwalya Nkonde 10 held that a notice of postponement
must be issued and the Judge’s marshall must inform the legal representatives involved.

COMP No. IRCLK/154/2021
CAZ/08/23/2021.
9
SCZ Judgment No. 5 of 1984.
10
SCZ Appeal No. 2/2021.
7
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